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This article discusses paradoxes of properties and classes, such as the Liar paradox,
Russell’s paradox, Grelling-Nelson paradox. The main goals are (i) to spell out a common
principle underlying these paradoxes and (ii) to provide a semantic construction which is
general enough to treat them uniformly, and which has explanatory power as to why certain
sentences are paradoxical. The models presented below are fixed-point models à la [Kri75].
However, unlike Kripke models, they have enough resources for distinguishing between dif-
ferent kinds of sentences (e.g., liar-like and truth-teller-like sentences). Moreover, unlike
other fixed-point models that can account for different paradoxical phenomena, the ones
suggested here capture every insight about truth captured by Kripke models, particularly
the idea that truth is consistent and grounded in nonsemantic facts.
Keywords. Liar paradox · Russell’s paradox · Grelling-Nelson paradox · Truth-theories
· Fixed-point semantics · Non-classical logic · Groundedness
1 Introduction
Studying the paradoxes of self-reference, Graham Priest pointed out that “when one meets [them]
for the first time, one is struck by the fact that they all appear to be members of a single fam-
ily, generated by a common underlying principle” [Pri94, p.25]. Whether or not there is a
single common principle underlying all paradoxes of self-reference is not an easy question. How-
ever, it seems undeniable that some common principle(s) underlie some of them. For example,
well-known paradoxes of self-reference such as the Liar, the Grelling-Nelson, and Russell’s have
arguably several common underlying principles, along with the fact that they all involve some
kind of self-reference. In particular, each antinomy involves a predicate (truth predicate, het-
erologicality predicate, and membership relation, respectively) exhibiting a similar paradoxical
behaviour. The main goal of this article consists in spelling out a common principle underlying
these paradoxes and in providing a semantic construction which is general enough to treat them
uniformly. The underlying idea is that we need a theory of paradox, which explains why some
statements are paradoxical.
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The existing literature on this kind of paradoxes is overwhelming, and it would be impossible
to compare one’s proposal with all (or even a significant portion of) the others. This article
will focus on approaches involving the very powerful and very popular tool known as fixed-point
semantics, and our starting point will be Kripke’s seminal paperOutline of a theory of truth.1 The
Outline presents an extremely intuitive and extremely natural theory of truth, and it provides
a simple solution to the Liar paradox. In a nutshell, using Strong Kleene Logic (SK), Kripke
describes a general inductive procedure for obtaining a class of partial and consistent models for
a language containing a self-applicable truth predicate Tr.2 These models are called fixed-point
models (or just fixed-points). Fixed-point models of [Kri75] are ‘consistent’, in the sense that
they do not satisfy contradictions, and they are ‘partial’, in the sense that they allow truth value
gaps, i.e., sentences which are neither true nor false. In particular, paradoxical sentences (such as
liar sentences claiming of themselves that they are false) lack a truth value, they are undefined.
The procedure described by Kripke for obtaining fixed-point models is versatile, and it can be
used to provide a solution for a number paradoxes of properties and classes.3
Among the worries raised against [Kri75], one concerns a form of expressive weakness his
theory is confronted with, and it relates to the way his account distinguishes between paradoxical
sentences and sentences which are not paradoxical but are nonetheless pathological. To explain
the problem perspicuously, consider the following list of sentences:
1. The number 1 is bigger than the number 0.
2. The number 1 is smaller than the number 0.
3. Sentence (3) is false.
4. Sentence (4) is true.
Intuitively, these are different kinds of sentences. The first sentence is a simple truth; the second
sentence is a simple falsity; the third sentence is a paradoxical liar sentence (declaring it true or
1The literature inspired by [Kri75] is extremely vast. In particular, there is a branch of the literature related
to a Kripkean fixed-point semantics that will not be discussed here. It is the branch that investigates the addition
of a well-behaved (or arguably so) material conditional → to the base language. Extensive research on this has
been carried out by Hartry Field. Combining ingredients of a Kripkean semantics with some revision theoretic
techniques [GB93], his main goal consisted in defining a “nice” conditional satisfying all instances of the T-
Schema, while avoiding revenge phenomena (see in particular [Fie04, Fie08, Fie14]). For a critical evaluation
see, e.g., [RW07, Wel11, Wel14], and for similar investigations see e.g. [Bac13, Ros16]. An alternative proposal
has been recently suggested and defended by [Lei19], where the added conditional, although not delivering every
instance of the T-Schema, improves the behaviour of the Fieldian conditional.
2Actually, it would be more appropriate to talk about “Kripke’s method for obtaining semantic theories of
truth”, rather than “Kripke’s theory of truth”, as Kripke considers different three-valued semantics, without
committing for SK. For simplicity, though, in this paper I concentrate on Kripke’s theory based on SK.
3The seminal papers for the consistent fixed-point semantics in philosophical logic are [Kri75] and [MW75],
both concentrating on the Liar paradox and on models for the truth-predicate (the latter applied Zorn’s lemma
to obtain maximal fixed points). This method was then adapted e.g. by [Mad83] to the case of classes by allowing
gaps in the membership relation. As reported by [Fef84], this kind of construction for type-free theories of
predication and classes, where the inductive method of building fixed-point models is used, were introduced much
earlier by Fitch and Gilmore, e.g. [Fit48], [Gil74], [Fit80]. For an excellent overview on the historical and technical
development of the fixed-point semantics, see [Can09, §§4-5].
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false yields a contradiction); the fourth sentence is a pathological-but-unparadoxical truth-teller
sentence (it can consistently and arbitrarily be declared true or false). It is well known that,
as it was pointed out by Visser [Vis84], we cannot make these intuitive distinctions in Kripke
models. In particular, none of the models of [Kri75], on its own, is sharp enough to distinguish
between Liars, Truth-tellers, and simple truths and falsities (cf. [Vis84, pp. 181-182]).4 In other
words, models of [Kri75] do not know that liar sentences are paradoxical.
A solution to this problem can be found in Visser’s article: it can be shown that the inductive
construction of fixed-point models can be carried out while allowing both truth-value gaps and
truth-value gluts (i.e., sentences which are both true and false).5 Specifically, one can retain the
inductive structure presented in [Kri75] while using the well-known four-valued Belnap-Dunn
Logic, also known as First Degree Entailment (FDE).6 FDE-models, being four-valued, are sharp
enough to differentiate different kinds of sentences, since they can declare Liars both-true-and-
false, Truth-tellers neither-true-nor-false, and simple truths and falsities just true, or just false,
respectively. In other words, four-valued models overcome the inadequacy of Kripke’s three-
valued ones: they know that Liars are paradoxical.
FDE-fixed-point models (and variants thereof) have been explored in depth, from both a
mathematical and a conceptual point of view.7 Much less attention, though, has received the
question whether the use of FDE, whilst delivering more expressive models, lets us preserve
virtues of and insights captured by Kripkean models. Perhaps, one of the reasons why this
question has not been addressed adequately so far is that it might appear to have an obvious
answer. For example, in the introductory remarks of “Bilattices and the theory of truth”, Fitting
remarks that FDE
loses none of the original insights, since Kleene’s strong three-valued logic is a natural
sublogic of Belnap’s [...], and it makes possible a treatment that has its own intuitive
satisfaction [...]; after all, a sentence asserting its own falsehood could be taken to be
overdetermined as well as underdetermined.
[Fit89, p. 225]
However, it will be shown that the question whether FDE-models capture every insight cap-
tured by SK-models does not have an obvious answer. Indeed, it will be shown that there is a
4As it will be explained below, [Kri75]’s differentiation between these different kinds of objects exploits the
whole class of fixed-points. However, no single model can see the difference between them.
5To be clear: the import of Visser’s paper goes far beyond solving the expressiveness issue of models of [Kri75].
I am concentrating on this aspect, as it is most relevant for the present purposes. Also, the same solution can be
found in Woodruff’s [Woo84].
6This logic is due to Nuel Belnap and Michael Dunn, appeared in the seminal papers [Bel77],[Dun76].
7The work of Visser and Woodruff has been extended further by Leitgeb [Lei99]. Both Visser and Leitgeb work
in an abstract algebraic setting, and the latter has shown that one can obtain fixed-point like models for any logic
whose algebra reduct is a De Morgan lattice (note that both First Degree Entailment and Strong Kleene logic
are De Morgan lattices). Work in this area has also been done, e.g., by Fitting, who has shown that Kripke-style
models can be obtained for the algebraic structures known as bilattices [Fit89] (again, note that Belnap-Dunn
logic is a bilattice). Mention should also be made of related work by Cantini [Can89], where he studies classical
models for a language containing two unary predicates Tr and Fa (truth and falsity) whose extensions are allowed
to overlap. See also [Can96].
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strong sense in which Fitting’s remark does not stand up under a closer scrutiny: besides giv-
ing up on the consistency of truth (which could already be considered to be a major departure
from SK-models), any FDE-model which is sharp enough for distinguishing between Liars and
Truth-tellers loses a crucial insight captured by the minimal SK-fixed-point, namely that truth
is grounded in nonsemantic facts. That truth is grounded in nonsemantic facts essentially means
that what is true ultimately rests on whether certain sentences not containing the truth predi-
cate are true.8 As we shall see, in sharp FDE-models there are ungrounded sentences which are
(strictly) true, or (strictly) false. This creates an important gap within a fixed-point semantics
approach, and it gives rise to the following
Question. Can we construct fixed-point models which (i) have enough resources for distin-
guishing between different kinds of sentences and (ii) can retain the insights about truth captured
by SK-models, particularly the idea that truth is consistent and grounded in nonsemantic facts?
This article will provide a positive answer: using a four-valued but consistent semantics, it will
introduce fixed-point models satisfying both (i) and (ii).
There are two further aspects concerning the semantic construction to be introduced which
are important to emphasize. The first is that it not only differentiates paradoxical from unpara-
doxical sentences, but it also has explanatory power as to why certain sentences are paradoxical.
More precisely, it provides an inductive characterization of paradoxical instance of a predicate,
according to which whether a sentence is paradoxical will depend on a set of base paradoxical sen-
tences. The second aspect is that the new semantics will spell out a common principle underlying
a number of paradoxes involving paradoxical predicates. In particular, the analysis undertaken
below supports the idea that the reason why, e.g., liar sentences are paradoxical instances of the
truth predicate is the same as the reason why, e.g., the Russell class is a paradoxical instance
of the membership relation. Via a suitable formalisation of this common underlying principle, it
will be possible to treat various paradoxes uniformly.
Plan of the article. The article is structured as follows: §2 introduces the kind of
paradoxes I will be dealing with, informally explaining how they are related to each other. §3
presents the consistent and the paraconsistent fixed-point semantics, explaining in more details
the problems mentioned above. §4 outlines informally the alternative semantics, and §5 gives it
formal expression. §6 contains an analysis and a comparison between the minimal fixed-points
of the different approaches. §7 briefly discusses the issues of expressive weakness and revenge
phenomena. The main theorems to come are then proved in a technical Appendix.
2 The paradoxes, an informal sketch
In order to obtain a more general description of the family of paradoxical predicates considered
in this article, I consider three representative examples, beginning with the Liar paradox. It
is assumed that the designated objects of the truth predicate Tr, i.e., the objects to which Tr
8For more on groundedness, see [Yab82], [Lei05], [Hal14, §17].
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applies, are sentences. Paradoxical instances of Tr are liar sentences, that it, sentences of the
form
(L) L is not-true.
These sentences cannot be consistently declared true or not-true. Yet why, it may be asked, Liars
cannot be consistently declared true or not-true? Suppose—one can continue—we do declare L
true. If we additionally assumed that a sentence is true iff what the sentence says is the case,
that is if we assumed that
T-Schema For any sentence ϕ, Trpϕq and ϕ are equivalent,9
then we would have to say that L is also not-true, because that is what L says. But if we do not
assume T-Schema, then we could consistently declare L true, or not-true. More precisely, then,
we have that:
Fact 1 Liars, assuming T-Schema, cannot be consistently declared true, or not-true.
Isomorphic considerations hold for what will be called here the membership paradox.10 It is
assumed that designated objects of the binary membership relation ∈ are pairs of objects 〈a, b〉,
where b is a collection of objects. I also assume that collections are themselves objects. Now let
{x | ϕ} denote the collection of objects that satisfy ϕ, and assume that the relation ∈ is such
that,
M-Schema For any property ϕ, there exists a collection {x | ϕ} such that, for any object a,
“a ∈ {x | ϕ}” and ϕ(a) are equivalent.
Now consider the collection r := {x | x /∈ x}. AssumingM-Schema, the following are equivalent:
{x | x /∈ x} ∈ {x | x /∈ x} and {x | x /∈ x} /∈ {x | x /∈ x}.
It follows that r cannot consistently be declared member or not-member of itself. In other words,
the pair 〈r, r〉 is a paradoxical instance of ∈. However, if we do not assume M-Schema, nothing
prevents us from saying that r ∈ r or that r /∈ r.11 Hence, more precisely:
Fact 2 The collection r := {x | x /∈ x}, assuming M-Schema, cannot be consistently declared
member of itself, or non-member of itself.
9The expression pϕq is a name for the sentence ϕ. On the notion of equivalence more will be said in due course.
10I avoid using the label ‘Russell’s paradox’, as the latter has a different flavour, namely the paradox shows
that naïve comprehension is false: it is not the case that for any property ϕ there exists the set {x | ϕ}, otherwise
we could construct the set r := {x | x /∈ x} and r ∈ r iff r 6∈ r. In other words, Russell’s paradox (primarily)
shows that r is not an object of set theory.
11Needless to say, it would be odd to claim that r ∈ r or that r /∈ r, just as it would be odd to claim that a
liar sentence is true, or that it is not-true. In the first case, it would not be clear what we would mean by ‘a is a
(non-)member of the collection b’, and in the latter it would not be clear what we would mean by ‘ϕ is true’.
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A slightly different analysis underlies the Grelling-Nelson paradox [GN07]: the reason why we
cannot consistently declare the heterologicality predicate heterological or not-heterological is
that, by definition, a predicate ϕ(x) is heterological iff ϕ(x) is not ϕ.12 Hence:
Fact 3 ‘Heterological’, by definition of ‘x is heterological’, cannot be consistently declared
heterological, or not-heterological.
To generalize then, this article deals with those paradoxes involving a predicate P which has
paradoxical instances among its designated objects. These instances are paradoxical in the sense
that they cannot consistently be declared P or not-P . Or more precisely, assuming some basic
principle(s) about P , there are objects a for which the claims “a is P ” and “a is not-P ” are
equivalent.
3 Fixed-point semantics, and its philosophical issues
This section discusses the two influential solutions to the kind of paradox mentioned above, i.e.,
the consistent and the paraconsistent fixed-point semantics. We assume the reader being familiar
with these solutions.
3.1 Language and Notation
First-order Peano arithmetic, PA, will be used background theory of syntax.13 The language LP
denotes the language of PA, in the signature {0, S,+,×}, extended by a k-ary predicate P . The
language LPA := LP \{P} is the P -free fragment of LP . Terms and formulae are generated by
closing off under ¬,∨,∃ (∧,∀,→,↔ are defined according to classical logic). An LP -expression
is a term or a formula of LTr. The expression n is the numeral corresponding to the number
n ∈ ω. Fixing a canonical Gödel numbering of LP -expressions, if e is an LP -expression, the
Gödel number (= gn) of e is denoted by #e and peq is the term representing #e in LPA.
Unless otherwise specified: ‘pathological’ means ‘pathological-but-unparadoxical’; λ and τ
are variables ranging over Liars and a Truth-tellers, that is, fixed points of the formulae ¬Tr(x)
and Tr(x), for Tr a monadic truth-predicate.14 The standard interpretation for LPA is denoted
by N and the set of natural numbers is denoted by ω. Finally, SK and FDE denote, respectively,
Strong Kleene logic and First Degree Entailment (the latter is also know as Belnap-Dunn logic).
12For instance, ‘monosyllabic’ is heterological as it is polysyllabic while ‘polysyllabic’ is autological, as it is
polysyllabic. In a formal setting, we understand properties as formulae with one free variable x. To be more
precise (but in this article that is unnecessary), properties are expressed by a formula ϕ(x, ~p) with a distinguished
free variable x, and ~p a (possibly empty) set of other free variables (“parameters”).
13This is only for simplicity. No result, nor any philosophical consideration, depends on the use of PA and as
base theory.
14The syntactic shape of Liars and Truth-tellers depends on the chosen framework. For example, if working with
an arithmetic base theory such as Robinson’s or Peano arithmetic, they can be obtained via weak diagonalization:
Given a formula ϕ, its weak diagonalization is ∃x(x = pϕq ∧ ϕ). To obtain a fixed point of ¬Tr(x) it suffices to
weakly diagonalize ∃y(Diag(x, y) ∧ ¬Tr(y)), where Diag represents, in PA, the primitive recursive function diag
mapping the code of each formula to the code of its diagonalization.
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3.2 Consistent fixed-points
Let 〈N, (E,A)〉 be a partial structure expanding N by an interpretation (E,A) for Tr. Call E
(A) the (anti-)extension of Tr. Let VSK〈N,(E,A)〉 : LTr −→ {1, 0, u} be the SK valuation function
assigning a value to LTr-sentences in 〈N, (E,A)〉. Let St ⊆ ω be the set of codes of LTr-sentences,
and set NSt := ω − St. Then
Definition 3.1 (SK-Kripke Jump). The SK-Kripke Jump is a function ΦSK : ℘(ω)2 −→ ℘(ω)2
on disjoint pairs (E,A) of subsets of ω defined by:
ΦSKE (E,A) := {#ϕ | VSK〈N,(E,A)〉(ϕ) = 1},
ΦSKA (E,A) := {#ϕ | VSK〈N,(E,A)〉(ϕ) = 0} ∪NSt,
ΦSK(E,A) := (ΦSKE (E,A),Φ
SK
A (E,A)).
The operator ΦSK can be shown to have fixed-points, i.e., pairs (E,A) such that (E,A) =
ΦSK(E,A).15 In particular, there exists a least (or minimal)16 fixed-point (Eµ, Aµ) which is con-
tained in every other fixed-point (Eκ, Aκ), in the sense that Eµ ⊆ Eκ and Aµ ⊆ Aκ. Structures
〈N, (E,A)〉 such that (E,A) = ΦSK(E,A) will be called consistent (or SK) fixed-point models
(or just fixed-points) for LTr, as no sentence in this structures is both true and false. That is to
say, fixed-points of ΦSK satisfy the condition
E ∩A = ∅.
Using the class of fixed-points of ΦSK, one can differentiate between paradoxical and pathological
instances of Tr as follows. Paradoxical instances are undefined everywhere, that is, they are
outside the interpretation of Tr in every fixed-point (cf. [Kri75, p. 708]). Pathological-but-
unparadoxical instances, on the contrary, are true or false somewhere, that is, they are inside the
interpretation of Tr in some fixed-point, but they are undefined in the minimal fixed-point.17
The apparent problem with this characterization is that we need a “metamodel” of the various
fixed-point models to differentiate different kinds of sentences. There is no single model that can
see the difference between paradoxical instances, pathological instances, and simple truths and
falsities. For instance, if we take the minimal fixed-point of ΦSK, then it can be observed that
this model does not see the difference between Liars and Truth-tellers, as they are all simply
undefined and they are all simply outside the interpretation of Tr. And if we take a fixed-point
of ΦSK such that (some) Truth-tellers are, say, in the extension of Tr, then this model would not
know the difference between such pathological sentences and other sentences which are simply
15Indeed, given a sound interpretation of Tr, that is an interpretation (E,A) such that both E ⊆ ΦSKE and
A ⊆ ΦSKA , we can obtain a fixed-point by iterating Φ
SK on this pair transfinitely many times (see e.g. [Fit86] for
details).
16I will often use ‘minimal’ instead of the more precise, but in the present context less common, ‘least’ fixed-
point.
17It is possible to make finer-grained distinctions between sentences. For example, there are sentences which
have an intrinsic truth-value, or ungrounded sentences which have always the same value in all fixed-points where
they have one, but which do not have an intrinsic truth-value. See [Kri75, pp. 708-709] for details.
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The minimal fixed-point is usually taken to be particularly interesting. For example, Kripke
described the minimal fixed-point of ΦSK as “probably the most natural model for the intuitive
concept of truth” [Kri75, p. 708]. Yet, a natural requirement for a natural model of the intuitive
concept of truth seems to be that it be able, as we are, to know the difference between paradoxical
sentences (culprit of giving rise to the Liar paradox) and pathological ones (more innocuous
sentences, not implying any inconsistency).19 Albert Visser endorsed four valued logics exactly
on the basis of such considerations, emphasizing that “[o]ne attractive feature of four valued logic
for the study of the Liar Paradox is the possibility of making certain intuitive distinctions within
one single model ” [Vis84, pp. 181-182]. Visser is referring precisely to the distinction between
Liars and Truth-tellers (Samesayers, in his terminology). So let us have a closer look at how
these four-valued models overcome the inadequacy of the three-valued ones.
3.3 Paraconsistent fixed-points
The consistent fixed-point semantics presented in the previous section can be generalized to a
paraconsistent one.20 Paraconsistent (or FDE) fixed-point models for LTr are the same kind
of structure as consistent fixed-points, i.e., they are (possibly) partial structures 〈N, (E,A)〉
expanding N with a pair (E,A) interpreting Tr. The difference between SK and FDE fixed-
points lies in the interaction between E and A: in FDE models, the intersection between E and
A is allowed to be non empty.
More precisely, letting VFDE〈N,(E,A)〉 : LTr −→ {1, 0, b, u} be the FDE valuation function assigning
a truth-value to LTr-sentences in the structure 〈N, (E,A)〉, we have
Definition 3.2 (FDE Kripke Jump). The FDE-Kripke Jump is a function ΦFDE : ℘(ω)2 −→
℘(ω)2 on pairs (E,A) of subsets of ω defined by:
ΦFDEE (E,A) := {#ϕ | VFDE〈N,(E,A)〉(ϕ) ∈ {1, b}},
ΦFDEA (E,A) := {#ϕ | VFDE〈N,(E,A)〉(ϕ) ∈ {0, b}} ∪NSt,
ΦFDE(E,A) := (ΦFDEE (E,A),Φ
FDE
A (E,A)).
18Incidentally, let me remark that a similar problem can be ascribed to revision theories of truth [GB93,
Her82a, Her82b]. Several models have to be taken into account in order to differentiate Liars, Truth-tellers,
and simple truths and falsities. For a comparison between fixed-point semantics and revision theory, see e.g.
[Bur86, Kre09, Wel01].
19A very similar point is made by [Ros19]. Indeed, Rossi’s article appears to have the same motivation as the
present one, even though he restricts the analysis to languages containing a truth predicate. His goal is to obtain a
single semantic evaluation that can differentiate different kinds of pathological sentences. His framework, however,
is very different from the one introduced below. Rossi provides a graph-theoretic analysis of the paradoxes and,
based on an isomorphism about and between semantic graphs, he defines a canonical evaluation which constitutes
the core of his theory. On this evaluation, the value of a sentence is either a numerical value or a set of equations.
The framework introduce below, on the other hand, is a more familiar Kripkean-style fixed-point semantics, where
models are set-theoretic structures built inductively using a monotone operator on the powerset of ω. In any case,
considering the similarity of the motivations for this project and that of [Ros19]’s, I will refer to Rossi’s paper
elsewhere in this article in order to point out some similarities and differences.
20For an overview on paraconsistent logics, see e.g. [Pri02, Rip15].
Australasian Journal of Logic (18:7) 2021, Article no. 2
696
Also the operator ΦFDE can be shown to have fixed-points (E,A) = ΦFDE(E,A),21 and it
also has a least fixed-point contained in every other fixed-point.22 The class of fixed-points of
ΦFDE, though, is more diverse than the class of fixed-points of ΦSK. In particular, fixed-points
of ΦFDE may but need not be such that E ∩ A 6= ∅, and they may but need not be such that
E ∪ A = ω.23 For simplicity, however, I restrict my attention to those models differentiating
between paradoxical and pathological sentences, i.e., those having paradoxical instances in E∩A
and pathological sentences outside E ∪ A. Hence, when I talk about FDE fixed-point models, I
mean structures 〈N, (E,A)〉 satisfying the conditions
E ∪A 6= ω and E ∩A 6= ∅.
In particular, paradoxical sentences such as liar sentences will be in E ∩A, whereas pathological
ones such as truth-teller sentences will be simply outside E∪A. Consequently, the differentiation
between paradoxical and pathological sentences can be provided within single models. FDE fixed-
points, in other words, are able to detect paradoxical instances, and to differentiate them from
pathological ones.
However, the price we have to pay for the gained sharpness might be too high. One problem
this approach has to face has been mentioned in the introduction and it will be discussed in
section 6—in the comments following Observation 6.1 and Proposition 6.2. But another evident
problem can be mentioned straight away: we would have to accept contradictions. We would
have to say that something (at the same time, in the same respect, etc.) is both true and not-
true.24 The dialetheic idea, according to which some contradictions can be true, is not always
met with enthusiasm. Saying that something is both true and false, and more generally saying
that something is both P and not-P , is a claim that not everyone is willing to accept. Be that
as it may, as a decorous discussion of dialetheism would deserve a separate article, it will not be
discussed here. It will just be dogmatically assumed that contradictions cannot be true.25
4 A new fixed-point semantics, an informal outline
This section outlines informally the new fixed-point semantics, which overcomes the inadequacies
of the semantics presented in the previous section. As already mentioned, one goal consists in
developing a semantic construction to deal uniformly with paradoxes involving a paradoxical
21They can be obtained in the same way as one obtains consistent fixed-points, i.e., it suffices to iterate ΦFDE
transfinitely many times on sound interpretations of Tr. Cf. footnote 15.
22Actually, the minimal fixed-points of the SK- and of the FDE-Kripke Jump are identical.
23For instance, the least fixed-point is such that E ∪A 6= ω and E ∩A = ∅.
24A caveat is in order: The authors who first introduced and studied paraconsistent fixed-point models, [Woo84]
and [Vis84] (see also [Fef84, Can96, Lei99]), have not endorsed dialetheism, as they were primarily interested in
the mathematical properties of such constructions (in particular: (i) working with FDE produces a complete
lattice of fixed-points, whereas using SK only gives a semilattice and (ii) it can be shown that models satisfying
gluts are isomorphic to models having gaps). I mention contradictions and dialetheism because of the way I am
treating the pair (E,A) interpreting Tr, i.e., E is taken to contain everything which is Tr and A everything which
is not-Tr. Under this reading (which of course is not the only possibility), a model where E ∩A 6= ∅ is ipso facto
a model saying that something is both Tr and not-Tr.
25[PBAG06] contains several articles defending the possibility of true contradictions. See also e.g. [Pri06, Bea09].
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predicate P . Specifically, the aim is to obtain models which know the difference between para-
doxical and pathological instances of P , and which know why some instances are paradoxical.
This section, then, also discusses what qualifies as paradoxical. In particular, I shall spell out
a common underlying principle making, e.g., liar sentences paradoxical instances of the truth
predicate, the pair 〈r, r〉 a paradoxical instance of the membership relation, the predicate ‘x is
heterological’ a paradoxical instance of the heterologicality predicate, and so forth.
4.1 A new structure
In classical first-order logic, the interpretation of a predicate P is just a single set, E. E is the
extension of P , and it contains everything which is P , anything else being in the complement
of E. Accordingly, we have two truth-values, true and false, and every sentence has exactly one
value: P (t)—assuming for simplicity that P is a unary predicate—is true (false), precisely if the
value of the term t is (not) in E. As we have seen, this simple picture changes with the fixed-point
semantics: an interpretation for LP is a more complex structure, where the interpretation of P is
a pair of sets (E,A). We still have two truth-values,26 but a different interaction between E and
A is then what distinguishes the consistent and the paraconsistent semantics. In the consistent
semantics, some sentences may lack a truth-value. In the paraconsistent semantics, not only
some sentences may lack a truth-value, but some other may have both truth-values.
The fixed-point structure presented below does not just modify the interaction between ex-
tension and anti-extension of P , but it is a new kind of structure altogether: the interpretation of
P is not a single set, it is not a pair, but it is a triple; a triple of pairwise disjoint sets (E,A,X),
where E and A are the usual extension and anti-extension of P , and X is a paradox-set. In
other words, an interpretation for LP is a structure 〈N , (E,A,X)〉, where N interprets LPA, and
(E,A,X) is an interpretation of P . This new kind of interpretation of paradoxical predicates
has several virtues, both philosophical and technical. The salient features of these structures will
be presented in some details below, after having provided a more formal definition. But let me
here first concentrate on the philosophical rationale behind the addition of this third set, and let
me mention one important consequence this has on the set of truth-values.
Looking at the set of designated objects of P , we see that it can be partitioned (informally)
into four subsets:
(i) the set of objects which are uncontroversially P ;
(ii) the set of objects which are uncontroversially not-P ;27
(iii) the set of objects a which are neither uncontroversially P , nor uncontroversially not-P , and
for which the claims “a is P ” and “a is not-P ” are equivalent;
26I am interpreting the values u and b as representations of underdetermination and overdetermination, respec-
tively. Sentences with value u are neither true, nor false, they are underdetermined. Sentences with value b are
both true and false, they are overdetermined. Cf. [Kri75] and [Bel19].
27Arguably, many paradoxical predicates have this property. For example, 0 = 0 can be taken to be uncontro-
versially true, my red shirt can be taken to be uncontroversially outside the set of only blue objects, and so on.
If there exist predicates P for which it is always controversial to decide whether something is or is not P , then
these predicates are left out from the present analysis.
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(iv) the set of objects which are neither uncontroversially P , nor uncontroversially not-P , and
which can consistently be declared P or not-P .
This taxonomy should not be surprising, as it is implicitly contained in the fixed-point semantics
analysed above. However, there is an aspect of this taxonomy I would like to emphasize, namely
that there is a sense in which elements of the first three sets (i)-(iii) are on a par with each other,
while elements of the fourth set are not.
Call an interpretation I of P acceptable only if it decides correctly uncontroversial cases—that
is, it declares P elements of (i) and non-P elements of (ii). Since we are rejecting dialetheism, it
can be observed that in any acceptable interpretation of P , objects which are uncontroversially
(not-)P are in the (anti-)extension of P , and objects which cannot be consistently declared P or
not-P are outside E ∪A. However, objects which can consistently be declared P or not-P are in
E in some acceptable interpretations, they are in A in some other, and they are outside E ∪ A
in some other still. In this sense, one could say that elements of (i)-(iii) are exactly related to
extension and anti-extension of P , whereas elements of (iv) are loosely related to (E,A). And
in this sense, elements of (i)-(iii) are on a par with each other, while elements of (iv) are not.
This justifies the addition of a third set into the interpretation of P : objects that are related in
the same way to P have the same status in the formal interpretation of P , and each category is
contained in one set of the triple (E,A,X).28
4.2 A new truth-value.
Having extended the fixed-point style interpretation of a predicate in this way, what about the
semantic values that sentences can take within these structures? For example, consider a sentence
of the from P (t). Clearly, if the value of the term t is an object which is in the extension of P ,
then we would expect P (t) to be true. And similarly, if the value of t is an object which is in the
anti-extension of P , then we would expect P (t) to be false. The questions here are: if the value
of t is an object which is in the paradox-set of P , should the sentence P (t) have a truth-value,
and if so, what value should it have? The present suggestion is that this kind of sentences do not
simply lack a truth-value, nor do they posses a combination of the True and the False. These
sentences have a different truth-value: they are paradoxical.
Paradoxical, in other words, is taken to be a truth-value, and it is not like the value both-
true-and-false of the Belnap-Dunn semantics, which was thought of as a formal representation
of the presence of inconsistent data.29 Recall, in fact, that according to Belnap, “[a sentence]
is ontologically either True or False, and such ontological truth-values will receive their due”
[Bel19, p. 46] (emphasis in the original). To the contrary, here the value Paradoxical is taken
to be on a par with the values True and False, just as the set X is on a par with E and A.
Following Belnap’s terminology, the present suggestion is that a sentence is ontologically True,
28I should mention that the idea of adding a third set for paradoxical sentences is not new. As an anonymous
referee correctly pointed out to me, in the context of semantic theories of truth it was suggested by Rossi [Ros16],
although for different purposes and with a different formal development.
29Similarly, the value u (undefined) only formally represents the lack of truth-values. Compare also [Kri75,
footnote 18].
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False, or Paradoxical, and such ontological truth-values will receive their due. It should be
stressed that the suggestion of treating Paradoxical as a truth-value is a consequence of having
a triple interpreting a paradoxical predicate, and not the starting point: since elements of E,
elements of A, and elements of X are (in a sense) on a par, it seems natural to let the truth-value
of sentences involving them to be (in a sense) on a par.
In Metaphysics 1011b25, Aristotle famously stated that
to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of
what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.
Some things are, and some things are not. Investigating paradoxes, we realize that some things
cannot consistently be and cannot consistently not-be. So one could say: To say of what cannot
be and cannot not-be that it is, or that it is not, is paradoxical.
4.3 Paradoxical instances
But how should we define ‘paradoxical instance of P ’? This is a difficult question, as it seems that
intuitions about what qualifies as paradoxical are debatable. Every account of paradoxicality,
arguably, will necessarily involve a degree of arbitrariness. Hence no claim about the optimality of
what follows will be made. Nonetheless, the inductive characterization of paradoxical instances of
P presented below has several virtues, among which that of avoiding some important objections
that Anil Gupta raised against Kripke’s characterization of paradoxical sentences (see [Gup82,
pp. 33-34]).
4.3.1 Base paradoxical instances.
As mentioned, paradoxical instances of P will be defined inductively. We thus need a starting
point. In other words: we need a set of base paradoxical instances of P , upon which the paradox-
set X can then be inductively constructed. The definition of base paradoxical instances will be
the formal expression of the informal characterization of paradoxical instances of P given in §2.
Recall that these were described as those elements that, assuming a basic principle about P ,
cannot be consistently declared P , or not-P . This principle is of the form
‘a is P ’ and π[a] are equivalent,
where π[a] expresses the condition(s) a has to satisfy in order to be P . Looking more closely at
the sentences giving raise to the paradoxes, it becomes evident that the reason why they cannot
be consistently declared P or not-P is that they are equivalent to the negation of π. Too see
this semi-formally, let e.g. Ht be the heterologicality predicate,30 λ a liar sentence, and ε̇ the
30It may be worth mentioning that the predicate “x is heterological” is mathematically definable, in Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory as well as in PA (see [Cie02] for details on the definition (and for a remarkable semantic proof
of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem via this heterologicality predicate)). The reason why I use a primitive
Ht is to make a parallel between paradoxes involving an arbitrary paradoxical predicate P , which may be not
arithmetically definable—the truth predicate being an example.
Australasian Journal of Logic (18:7) 2021, Article no. 2
700
membership relation. By definition,
‘ϕ(x)’ is heterological iff ¬ϕ(pϕ(x)q).
This means that here the principle π states that the formula ϕ(x), in order to be Ht, has to
satisfy the condition ¬ϕ(x). Yet, we have that
Ht(pHt(x)q) is equivalent to Ht(pHt(x)q),
that is, Ht(x) satisfies the negation of π. Similarly, whereas according to T-Schema
for any sentence ϕ,Trpϕq and ϕ are equivalent,
we have that
Trpλq is equivalent to ¬λ.
Similarly again, whereas according to M-Schema
for any property ϕ, there exists a collection {x | ϕ} such that, for any object a,
“a ∈ {x | ϕ}” and ϕ(a) are equivalent.
we have that, for ϕ ≡ ¬(x ε̇ x) and a := {x | ¬(x ε̇ x)},
a ε̇ {x | ϕ}︸ ︷︷ ︸
{x|¬(x ε̇ x)} ε̇ {x|¬(x ε̇ x)}
is equivalent to ¬ϕ(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
{x|¬(x ε̇ x)} ε̇ {x|¬(x ε̇ x)}
In conformity with this pattern, then, base paradoxical instances of P will be defined as
those instances a such that ‘a is P ’ and ¬π[a] are equivalent. The notion of equivalence between
paradoxical instances and the negation of π will be made precise in the next section.
It is important to emphasize that, albeit not encompassing, the informal characterization of
section 2 certainly singles out an important class of paradoxical instances of P . Hence, even
though this definition of base paradoxical instances will be incomplete, it may be seen as a
valid starting point that could then be improved. Additionally, the just mentioned informal
characterization provides a general template for arbitrary predicates P , and it can be used
for defining fixed-point models for arbitrary languages LP . Hence, even if for each particular
paradoxical predicate one could provide more accurate definitions of base paradoxical instances,
the one just suggested here is general enough to be implemented for an arbitrary paradoxical
predicate P .31
31Relatedly, the present construction is compatible with different definitions of the set of base paradoxical
instances, it just needs a definition be given. Hence, even though one might find one specific definition of base
paradoxical instances of P implausible, this does not speak against the construction as a whole, but just against
a particular implementation thereof.
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5 Fixed-point models for paradoxical predicates
This section gives formal expression to the ideas presented in the previous. I begin by defining a
new semantics, and I then define a class of fixed-point models for the truth-predicate Tr and for
the membership relation ε̇. After that, it will be shown how to generalize the construction for an
arbitrary paradoxical predicate P , thereby emphasizing one important aspect of the construction
below: its generality. It will be shown, in fact, that a structurally identical construction can
carried out for an arbitrary paradoxical predicate P .
5.1 SP, the Semantics of Paradox
Definition 5.1 (SP matrix). The SP matrixMSP is a triple 〈M,D,O〉, where
• M = {1, 0, p, u} is the set of truth values: true, false, paradoxical, undefined;32
• D = {1} is the set of the single designated value;
• O = {¬̇, ∧̇, ∨̇} is the set of primitive operations defined on M , whose behaviour is repre-
sented in Table 1.33






∨̇ 1 0 p u
1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 p u
p 1 p p u
u 1 u u u
∧̇ 1 0 p u
1 1 0 p u
0 0 0 0 0
p p 0 p u
u u 0 u u
The truth-tables share two properties with those of FDE.34 First, they are an extension of
SK’s truth tables, in the sense that whenever no component is p, they are exactly as SK’s truth
tables. Second, it can be observed that the interaction between p and a classical value is the
same as the interaction between b and a classical value, in the following sense. Given a binary
operation ◦̇, we have that 1 ◦̇ p = 1 iff 1 ◦̇ b = 1 and 1 ◦̇ p = p iff 1 ◦̇ b = b. Similarly for the
interaction between p and b with the value 0.35 The difference between SP and FDE lies in
32I am using u as a truth value only for technical simplicity. Philosophically, it only represents the lack of truth
values.
33The operations →̇ and ↔̇ are defined as usual.






∨̇ 1 0 b u
1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 b u
b 1 b b 1
u 1 u 1 u
∧̇ 1 0 b u
1 1 0 b u
0 0 0 0 0
b b 0 b 0
u u 0 0 u
35Observe that u interacts (in the above sense) with classical values just like b and p.
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the interaction between nonclassical values. In fact, in FDE the functions ∧̇ and ∨̇ on different
nonclassical values yield a classical value, namely ub = 0 and u∨. b = 1. Not so in SP, where
both ∧̇ and ∨̇ output u if they are given two different nonclassical values as input, that is,
up = u∨. p = u. This choice turns out to be convenient (as we shall later see in Proposition 6.2),
but it can be justified independently. Following Kleene, one can take u to be a value that might
change,36 for example, the undefined component of u ∨̇ p might become 1, 0, or p, and depending
on which value u would turn into, the value of u ∨̇ p would be different. This means that we do
not yet have enough information to assign a value to the sentence u ∨̇ p, and that is why its value
is u. Note that, for instance, u ∨̇ 1 = 1 because independently of what value u would turn into,
the value of u ∨̇ 1 will always be 1. To put it differently: we assign a truth-value to a sentences if,
and only if, we have enough information to do so; otherwise its value remains u (which formally
represents the lack of truth-values).
Definition 5.2. An SP-interpretation of a first-order language LP containing a k-ary predicate
P is a structure 〈N , (E,A,X)〉 satisfying the following conditions
1. N is an interpretation of LPA;
2. E ∪A ∪X ⊆ |N |k;
3. E ∩A = ∅, E ∩X = ∅, A ∩X = ∅.37
An SP-interpretation is
standard, if N = N;
partial, if E ∪A ∪X ( |N |k;
total, if E ∪A ∪X = |N |k;
Kripkean, if it is partial and X = ∅;38
classical, if it is total and X = ∅.
Let: I abbreviate (E,A,X); N be a model for LPA; LP (N ) be LP expanded by distinct
constants a,b, c . . . for elements a, b, c . . . of |N |;39 tN be the value of the closed term t ∈ LP (N )
in 〈N , I〉.
36[Kle71, p. 334-35] writes that “t, f and u must be susceptible of another meaning besides (i) ‘true’, ‘false’,
‘undefined’, namely (ii) ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘unknown (or value immaterial)’. Here ‘unknown’ is a category, whose
value we either do not know or choose for the moment to disregard; and it does not then exclude the other two
possibilities ‘true’ or ‘false’ ”.
37The definition of SP-interpretation for a language LP based on language L different from LPA and/or
with more than one predicate P is done in the obvious way, that is: an SP-interpretation is a structure
〈N , (E1, A1, X1), . . . , (En, An, Xn), . . .〉 constituted from a total structure N := (|N |, . . . ) for L, together with n
(possibly partial) predicates Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
38An SP-interpretation is in fact a generalization of the three-valued models defined by [Kri75].
39We expand the language to avoid dealing with variable assignments.
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Definition 5.3. A valuation function VSP〈N ,I〉 : StLP(N ) −→ {1, 0, p, u}, assigning to each sentence
ϕ ∈ LP (N ) a truth-value in the structure 〈N , I〉, is defined as follows (we write VSPI instead of
VSP〈N ,I〉):
(a)
VSPI (t = s) =
1 if tN = sN0 if tN 6= sN
(b)
VSPI (P (t1, . . . , tk)) =

1 if 〈tN1 , . . . , tNk 〉 ∈ E
0 if 〈tN1 , . . . , tNk 〉 ∈ A
p if 〈tN1 , . . . , tNk 〉 ∈ X
u if 〈tN1 , . . . , tNk 〉 /∈ E ∪A ∪X
(c)
VSPI (¬ϕ) = ¬̇ VSPI (ϕ)
(d) For ◦ = ∨,∧,



















for all b ∈ N ,VSPI (ϕ(b)) ∈ {p, 0}











(i) The interpretation of the quantifier ∃ is disjunctive, in the following sense. Just as a
disjunction ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn has value 1 iff some disjunct has value 1, the sentence ∃vϕ
has value 1 iff ϕ(a) has value 1 for some element a. Similarly, just as ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn
has value p iff some disjunct has value p an any other disjunct has value either p or 0, the
sentence ∃vϕ has value p iff ϕ(a) has value p for some element a and value p or 0 for any
other element b. Similarly for the values 0 and u.
(ii) As a consequence of Df. 5.3(a) and of the rules governing the connectives represented in
Table 1, the valuation function behaves classically on the P -free fragment of LP .
The SP-consequence relation is defined as preservation of designated values:
Australasian Journal of Logic (18:7) 2021, Article no. 2
704
Definition 5.5. Let Γ,∆ be finite sets of LP -sentences. Then ∆ is a consequence of Γ, symbol-
ically Γ
SP
∆, iff for all valuation VI holds: if VI(γ) = 1 for all γ ∈ Γ, then VI(δ) = 1 for some
δ ∈ ∆.
Due to connection mentioned between the truth-tables for SK and those for SP, the following
observation should come as no surprise:
Observation 5.6. Let 〈N, (E,A,X)〉 be an arbitrary SP-interpretation. Then, for all ϕ ∈ LTr
VSK〈N,(E,A)〉(ϕ) = 1 iff V
SP
〈N,(E,A,X)〉(ϕ) = 1
VSK〈N,(E,A)〉(ϕ) = 0 iff V
SP
〈N,(E,A,X)〉(ϕ) = 0
Proof. Letting ~t := t1, . . . , tk, it suffices to notice that VSK〈N,(E,A)〉(P (~t)) = 1 (0) iff 〈t
N
1 , . . . , t
N
k 〉 ∈
E (A) iff VSP〈N,(E,A,X)〉(P (~t)) = 1 (0), and then continue by a straightforward induction on ϕ.
SP-models, then, are closely related to SK-models. They agree on what is true and on what
is false. The difference between them is that sentences which are undefined in a SK-model can be
paradoxical in a SP-model. This simple observation turns out to be important for a number of
reasons. The first is that it implies that the logic of SP is simply SK, which is why I am talking






Proof. Suppose Γ SK ∆. We want to show that if every sentence in Γ has SP-value 1, then
some sentence in ∆ has SP-value 1. So assume every sentence in Γ has SP-value 1. Then,
by Observation 5.6, it follows that every sentence in Γ has SK-value 1, and hence (since we are
assuming Γ
SK
∆) some sentences in ∆ has SK-value 1. The conclusion, i.e., that some sentences
in ∆ has SP-value 1, follows by Observation 5.6. The right-to-left direction is shown in a similar
way.
If by logic we understand a notion of consequence relation between sets of sentences, then
the logic underlying SP is SK. This means that SP can be seen as a nonstandard definition of
Strong Kleene logic, which is more appropriate for dealing with certain semantic paradoxes.
5.2 LTr, and truth-related paradoxes.
In this section, we define fixed-point models for the language LTr. As mentioned, the interpre-
tation of Tr will be inductively constructed in stages. The extension E and the anti-extension
A of Tr will be grounded in arithmetical statements, according to the intuition that the status
of the claim that a sentence ϕ is true or false depends on the prior status of ϕ or ¬ϕ.40 The
paradox-set X, following the considerations of §4.3, will depend on base paradoxical instances
of Tr. These are defined as those sentences ϕ such that Trpϕq and ¬ϕ are equivalent. Or, to
put it in a more familiar and equivalent fashion, ϕ is a base paradoxical instance of Tr iff ϕ and
40Compare [Soa99, p. 181].
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¬Trpϕq are equivalent. Equivalent where, though? What are the scenarios we are interested
in? This question contains de facto two subquestions, the first of which is whether we take
all models for LPA into account or only the standard interpretation. Since this does not have
any philosophical implication in this context, we restrict our attention to the standard model
for the sake of simplicity. The second subquestion is whether we want to consider all possible
interpretations of Tr, or only a subclass of those.
One might e.g. argue that in order for a sentence λ to be a Liar-like sentence, it has to be
always equivalent to ¬Trpλq, no matter the interpretation of Tr. Another intuition might be
that a sentence λ is Liar-like if it is equivalent to ¬Trpλq, while assuming T-Schema. Indeed,
we have seen that without T-Schema in the background, one could not show that declaring
λ true, or untrue, yields an inconsistency. Similarly, one might be interested only in those
interpretations of Tr such that being untrue and being false (i.e., having a true negation) are
coextensive properties,41 or in those making Tr a compositional predicate, and so forth. Such
intuitions seem to be equally plausible, and it goes without saying that there are several others
one can think of. In other words, we can restrict the class of relevant interpretations of Tr in
various ways, and the stricter the restriction, the larger the class of base paradoxical instances
of Tr will get.
One virtue of the framework below is that it is compatible with different characterizations of
base paradoxical instances, hence it will be left open which definition is the most appropriate. For
simplicity, I present only two possible definitions, i.e., I consider only two classes of interpretations
of Tr, leaving other candidates for future research. The major difference between the two options
suggested below concerns the status of some paradigmatic sentences, such as: the McGee sentence
µ saying that there is an n such that n iterations of Tr on µ yields a not-true sentence; a Curry
sentence κ, saying that either κ is not-true or some absurdity (like 0 6= 0) holds; Liar cycles
λ1, λ2, . . . , λn where each Liar λi says of the next Liar λi+1 that it is not-true, and the last Liar
λn says that the first Liar λ1 is not-true.42 As it will turn out, Df. 5.10 implies that both µ and
Liar-cycles are paradoxical, whereas Df. 5.11 implies that they are undefined.
Let me begin by introducing a notion of equivalence over N, which holds between two sentences
precisely if they have the same value in every expansion of the standard model:
Definition 5.8 (Equivalence over N). Two sentences ϕ and ψ of LTr are equivalent over N,
symbolically ϕ ≡Neq ψ, iff VSP〈N,I〉(ϕ) = V
SP
〈N,I〉(ψ), for all SP-expansions I = (E,A,X) of N.
Let now an interpretation of Tr be adequate iff, for all sentences ϕ ∈ LTr, #ϕ ∈ Y iff
#Trpϕq ∈ Y , for Y = E,A,X,43 and let A := {I | I is an adequate interpretation of Tr}. Then
41Observe that if we do not assume that being untrue and being false are coextensive properties, we cannot
argue that a falsehood-teller, that is, a sentence φ equivalent to Trp¬φq cannot be consistently declared true or
untrue. We could only conclude that, assuming T-Schema, that both φ and ¬φ are true.
42For a formal definition of these sentences, see Appendix, Proposition 5.16.
43Note that this is not equivalent to saying that the interpretation is such that, for all ϕ,ϕ and Trpϕq have
the same value. For instance, the interpretation I defined by E := {#Trip0 = 1q | i ∈ ω}, A := ∅ =: X is such
that #ϕ ∈ Y iff #Trpϕq ∈ Y , for Y = E,A,X, but VSP〈N,I〉(0 = 1) = 0 and V
SP
〈N,I〉(Trp0 = 1q) = 1. An adequate
interpretation can be seen as one which “internalizes” the principle expressed by T-Schema.
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Definition 5.9 (Equivalence over adequate expansions of N). Two sentences ϕ and ψ of LTr are




These two notions of equivalence yield two different definitions of base paradoxical instances
of Tr, namely:
Definition 5.10 (Base Liars). The class Λ of base paradoxical instances of Tr contains all
sentences λ, such that:
λ ≡Aeq ¬Trpλq.
Definition 5.11 (Base Liars, alternative definition). The class Λ? of alternative base paradoxical
instances of Tr contains all sentences λ, such that:
λ ≡Neq ¬Trpλq.
Base Truth-tellers are defined similarly, i.e.:
Definition 5.12 (Base Truth-tellers). The class Θ of base pathological instances of Tr contains
all sentences τ , such that
τ ≡Aeq Trpτq.
The class Θ? of alternative base pathological instances of Tr contains all sentences τ , such that
τ ≡Neq Trpτq.
Note that Λ? ⊆ Λ and Θ? ⊆ Θ. For simplicity, then, in what follows I often refer only to Λ
and Θ. Having defined the necessary atomic blocks, we can now move on to defining a monotone
SP-Kripke Jump, whose fixed-points will serve as interpretations of Tr.
Definition 5.13 (SP Kripke Jump). The SP-Kripke Jump is a function ΦSP : ℘(ω)3 −→ ℘(ω)3
on pairwise disjoint triples (E,A,X) = I of subsets of ω defined by:
ΦSPE (I) := {#ϕ | VSP〈N,I〉(ϕ) = 1},
ΦSPA (I) := {#ϕ | VSP〈N,I〉(ϕ) = 0} ∪NSt,
ΦSPX (I) := {#ϕ | VSP〈N,I〉(ϕ) = p} ∪ Λ,
ΦSP(I) := (ΦSPE (I),ΦSPA (I),ΦSPX (I)).
Like ΦSK and ΦFDE, the operator ΦSP can be shown to be monotone and to have fixed-points.
To express this more precisely, given two SP interpretations I and I ′ of Tr, let I ≤ I ′ be defined
as E ⊆ E′, A ⊆ A′, and X ⊆ X ′. Then
Lemma 5.14 (Monotonicity). ΦSP is monotone, i.e., ΦSP(I) ≤ ΦSP(I ′) whenever I ≤ I ′.
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Proof. By induction on ϕ show that, whenever I ≤ I ′, for all ϕ ∈ LTr holds that
if VSPI (ϕ) ∈ {1, 0, p}, then VSPI (ϕ) = VSPI′ (ϕ).
ΦSP’s monotonicity then easily follows.
As usual, ΦSP’s monotonicity can be exploited to show the existence of fixed-points, and in
particular the existence of a least fixed-point contained in every other fixed-point:
Theorem 5.15.
(a) ΦSP has a least fixed-point Iµ which is contained in every other fixed-point. Moreover,
VSPIµ (λ) = p for all λ ∈ Λ and V
SP
Iµ (τ) = u for all τ ∈ Θ.
(b) Any fixed-point Iκ of ΦSP is such that VSPIκ (λ) = p for all λ ∈ Λ.
(c) Any fixed-point Iκ of ΦSP is such that VSPIκ (ϕ) = V
SP
Iκ (Trpϕq), for all ϕ ∈ LTr.
Proof. See Appendix for a detailed proof, where it is shown how to approach fixed-points from
below. Here I only observe that, since the Jump is defined only for pairwise disjoint triples, it is
important to verify that the set Λ does not intersect the extension or the anti-extension of Tr at
any stage in the transfinite sequence leading to a fixed-point.
We postpone the analysis of the minimal fixed-point of ΦSP to the next section, where it
will be compared with the minimal fixed-points of the consistent and paraconsistent semantics.
Let me conclude this section by stating more precisely that, as already mentioned, the main
difference between Λ and Λ? concerns the status of some paradigmatic sentences such as the
McGee sentence, Curry sentences and Liar cycles. So let ΦSP
?
be defined just as ΦSP but with
Λ? instead of Λ, and let ISPµ? be the minimal fixed-point of ΦSP
?
. Then
Proposition 5.16. (i) A Curry sentence κ is paradoxical in both ISPµ and ISPµ? ; (ii) the McGee
sentence µ is paradoxical in ISPµ and undefined in ISPµ? ; (iii) liar cycles are paradoxical in ISPµ
and undefined in ISPµ? .
Proof. See Appendix.
5.3 Lε̇, and the membership paradox.
Let me begin by emphasising that the goal here is not to provide a model for a theory of sets,
classes, or collections. The goal only consists in showing how to define SP-interpretations for a
binary membership relation ε̇ with the same method used to construct SP-interpretations for Tr.
That is, the aim is to define fixed-point models that (i) know that the pair 〈r, r〉 is a paradoxical
instance of ε̇ and (ii) are such that the value of t ε̇ {x | ϕ} is the same as ϕ[t/x] for all ϕ ∈ Lε̇.44
44For a similar construction, see e.g. [Bra71], [Fef84], [Res17]. In [Bra71], so called class terms are part of the
language.
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For the purposes of this section, assume we have a single device for both naming and ab-
straction for Lε̇.45 In particular, for any formula ϕ ∈ Lε̇ with free variables among ~x, ~y, (pϕq, ~y)
serves as an operation in L which abstracts ~x treating ~y as parameters. Define:
ϕ[x̂1, . . . , x̂k, y1, . . . , yn] = (pϕq, y1, . . . , yn)
In particular, for k = 1, I write (possibly n = 0)
{x | ϕ(x, y1, . . . , yn)} = ϕ[x̂, y1, . . . , yn]
The xi’s are considered bound and may be renamed by other bound variables. Let V be the
standard interpretation of L, and let its domain contains codes for {x | ϕ} for any formula ϕ of
Lε̇.46
As above, base paradoxical instances of ε̇ are defined as those pairs 〈t, s〉 such that the
claim t ε̇ s is equivalent to the negation of the principle about ε̇, that is the M-Schema. We
just consider the definition taking all interpretations of ε̇ into account, omitting parameters for
readability:
Definition 5.17 (Paradoxical and pathological instances). The class R of paradoxical instances
of ε̇ contains all pairs 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 such that:
t ε̇ {x | ϕ} ≡Veq ¬ϕ[t/x].
The class S of pathological but unparadoxical instances of ε̇ contains all pairs 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 such
that:
t ε̇ {x | ϕ} ≡Veq ϕ[t/x].
Observe that 〈r, r〉 ∈ R. In fact, r ε̇ {x | ¬(x ε̇ x)} is equivalent to ¬¬(x ε̇ x)[r/x], that is
to say, r ε̇ {x | ¬(x ε̇ x)} is equivalent to the formula obtained from the negation of ¬(x ε̇ x) by
replacing the free variable x by r. More perspicuously, note that
VSP〈V,I〉( {x | ¬(x ε̇ x)} ε̇ {x | ¬(x ε̇ x) }︸ ︷︷ ︸
r ε̇ {x | ¬(x ε̇ x)}
) = VSP〈V,I〉( {x | ¬(x ε̇ x)} ε̇ {x | ¬(x ε̇ x)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
(x ε̇ x)[r/x]
)
and since every sentence ϕ is equivalent to ¬¬ϕ, we get
VSP〈V,I〉( {x | ¬(x ε̇ x)} ε̇ {x | ¬(x ε̇ x) }︸ ︷︷ ︸
r ε̇ {x | ¬(x ε̇ x)}
) = VSP〈V,I〉( {x | ¬(x ε̇ x)} ε̇ {x | ¬(x ε̇ x)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
¬¬(x ε̇ x)[r/x]
)
In other words, the pair 〈r, r〉 is equivalent to the negation of M-Schema, which in turn implies
that 〈r, r〉 is a paradoxical instance of ε̇.
45[Fef84] defines a precise methodology for such a device. For details, which are not important here, the reader
is referred to Feferman’s article.
46See [Fef84] for details.
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Let Fml ⊆ |V| consist of all (codes of) {x | ϕ} for any formula ϕ(x) with at most x free,47
and let NFml be the set of pairs 〈tV, l〉 for l /∈ Fml.
Definition 5.18 (Epsilon Jump). The epsilon Jump, ΓSP, is a function on pairwise disjoint
triples (E,A,X) = I defined by:
ΓSPE (I) :=
{









〈tV, {x | ϕ}〉 | VSP〈V,I〉(ϕ[t/x]) = p
}
∪ R
ΓSP(I) := (ΓSPE (I),ΓSPA (I),ΓSPX (I))
Lemma 5.19 (Monotonicity). ΓSP is monotone.
Exploiting the monotonicity of the Jump ΓSP, we can find fixed-points which yield nice
interpretations for Lε̇. In particular, in these models every sentence t ε̇ {x | ϕ} will have the
same value as ϕ[t/x]. Moreover, these models know that 〈r, r〉 is a paradoxical instance of ε̇.
That is to say, in these models r ε̇ r has value p:
Theorem 5.20. Define an interpretation I ε̇ to be sound if I ε̇ ≤ ΦSP(I ε̇). Then
(a) ΓSP has a least fixed-point Iµ such that (i) VSPIµ (t ε̇ {x | ϕ}) = p for all 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 ∈ R,
and (ii) VSPIµ (t ε̇ {x | ϕ}) = u for all 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 ∈ S.
(b) Any fixed-point I ε̇κ of ΓSP is such that VSPIµ (t ε̇ {x | ϕ}) = V
SP
Iµ (ϕ[t/x]), for all ϕ ∈ Lε̇.
(c) Any fixed-point I ε̇κ of ΓSP is such that VSPIµ (t ε̇ {x | ϕ}) = p for all 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 ∈ R.
Proof. See Appendix.
5.4 Generalizing to LP .
Generalizing from the above examples, one can extract a general method for obtaining a class of
SP-fixed-point models for a language LP , for an arbitrary paradoxical predicate. So let P be a
k-ary predicate; let S be the standard interpretation for LP \{P} containing codes for syntactic
expressions of LP ; let D be the set of codes of designated objects of P ; let ND := |S|\D; let π be
the principle we associate with P . Then, as a first step we can define as above the paradoxical
and pathological instances of P :
Definition 5.21 (Paradoxical and pathological instances). The class P of paradoxical instances
of P contains all designated objects t1, . . . , tk of P such that
P (t1, . . . , tk) ≡Seq ¬π[tS1, . . . , tSk]
47Again, we omit parameters for simplicity.
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The class U of pathological but unparadoxical instances of P contains all designated objects
t1, . . . , tk of P such that
P (t1, . . . , tk) ≡Seq π[tS1, . . . , tSk]
Definition 5.22 (P -Jump). The P-Jump, ΠSP, is a function on pairwise disjoint triples (E,A,X) =
I defined by:
ΠSPE (I) := {〈tS1, . . . , tSk〉 ∈ D | V〈S,I〉(π[tS1, . . . , tSk]) = 1}
ΠSPA (I) := {〈tS1, . . . , tSk〉 ∈ D | V〈S,I〉(π[tS1, . . . , tSk]) = 0} ∪ND
ΠSPX (I) := {〈tS1, . . . , tSk〉 ∈ D | V〈S,I〉(π[tS1, . . . , tSk]) = p} ∪ P
ΠSP(I) := (ΠSPE (I),ΠSPA (I),ΠSPX (I))
It is not difficult to verify that ΠSP is monotone, and that it has fixed-points, among which
a least fixed-point differentiating between paradoxical and pathological instances of P . Also,
applying this definition, one can define fixed-point models for LHt48 within which: (i) the value
of Ht(pϕ(x)q) is the same as ¬ϕ(pϕ(x)q) for all ϕ(x); (ii) #Ht(x) is element of the paradox set
interpreting Ht.
6 Analysis and comparison of models for truth
This section focuses on the truth predicate, and it compares the minimal fixed-points of the
three semantics introduced above. The reason for concentrating on the minimal fixed-points
is that, as suggested by [Kri75, p. 708], the minimal fixed-point is probably the most natural
model for the intuitive concept of truth. The reason for concentrating on the truth predicate is
that the majority of the investigations mentioned above also focuses on languages containing Tr.
Nonetheless, even though the analysis will focus on models for LTr, similar remarks hold for an
arbitrary LP .
As mentioned, the minimal fixed-point of ΦFDE is not a dialetheic model, as E ∩A = ∅. But,
as mentioned, here we are interested in those FDE models having Liars in E∩A and Truth-tellers
outside E∪A. In other words, we are interested in those fixed-points of ΦFDE that are obtained by
iterating the Jump on interpretations declaring Liars both true and false. Formally, this can be
obtained by modifying Definition 3.2 of the FDE-Kripke Jump as follows. As in Definition 5.10,
define ΛFDE to be the set of sentences λ such that λ and ¬Trpλq are equivalent in every standard
FDE model 〈N, (E,A)〉, such that #ϕ ∈ E (A) iff #Trpϕq ∈ E (A). Then, hoping that keeping
the same notation for this Jump will not cause any confusion, define ΦFDE as follows:
ΦFDEE (E,A) := {#ϕ | VFDE〈N ,(E,A)〉(ϕ) ∈ {1, b}} ∪ Λ
FDE,
ΦFDEA (E,A) := {#ϕ | VFDE〈N ,(E,A)〉(ϕ) ∈ {0, b}} ∪ Λ
FDE ∪NSt,
ΦFDE(E,A) := (ΦFDEE (E,A),Φ
FDE
A (E,A)).
48Recall that Ht is the heterologicality predicate.
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Notation. The minimal fixed-points of ΦSP, ΦSK, and ΦFDE will be denoted by ISPµ , ISKµ , and
IFDEµ , respectively, or sometimes (ESPµ , ASPµ , XSPµ ), (ESKµ , ASKµ ), and (EFDEµ , AFDEµ ). Additionally,
for L = SP, SK,FDE and ILκ a fixed point, I write VLµ (ϕ) instead of VLILµ (ϕ).
The first question I am going to consider is what is the relationship between the minimal
SK-fixed-point and the minimal FDE-fixed-point. The latter is sharper, in the sense that it can
detect the difference between paradoxical and pathological sentences. But the disparity between
them is deeper, as these models do not agree on what is strictly true and strictly false:
Observation 6.1. (i) ESKµ 6= EFDEµ −AFDEµ . (ii) ASKµ 6= AFDEµ − EFDEµ .
Proof. I provide two examples. Since Liars and Truth-tellers have value b and u, respectively,
in the minimal FDE fixed-point, it follows that the disjunction λ ∨ τ has value 1 in the minimal
FDE fixed-point. That is to say: VFDEµ (λ ∨ τ) = 1, and hence #λ ∨ τ ∈ EFDEµ − AFDEµ . However,
λ∨ τ has value u in the minimal SK fixed-point, and hence #λ∨ τ /∈ ESKµ . Dually, VFDEµ (λ∧ τ) =
0 6= VSKµ (λ ∧ τ) = u hence #λ ∧ τ ∈ AFDEµ − EFDEµ but #λ ∧ τ /∈ ASKµ .
This observation shows that, pace Fitting, FDE-models do not preserve every insight about
truth and falsity captured by SK-models.49 As is well known, one attractive feature of the
Kripkean minimal fixed-point is that what is true and what is false is grounded in non-semantic
facts. What this means is that the truth and the falsity of any statement ultimately rests on
whether certain sentences not involving Tr are true or false.50 This is an important intuition
about the intuitive concept of truth that the Kripkean model is able to capture. In §3.3 it
was asked what is the price we would have to pay for the sharpness obtained with FDE models
and it was pointed out that accepting contradictions could have been already a high price to
pay. But Observation 6.1 shows that there is a different, and possibly higher, cost: there are
sentences which are strictly true (false) in IFDEµ , whose truth (falsity) is not grounded in non-
semantic facts. Whether this is a high cost to pay or not, of course depends on one’s view on
groundedness. What is certain, though, is that if one accepts the paraconsistent semantics, then
in order to obtain a sharper minimal fixed-point model, one has to give up not only consistency,
but also the groundedness of truth. In other words, one can no longer claim that the truth
and the falsity of any statement are grounded in non-semantic facts, and (more generally) one
cannot preserve every insight about truth captured by SK-models. Also, it seems important to
emphasize that advocates of FDE-models are faced with the following additional question: How
can we philosophically justify that sentences like λ ∨ τ are strictly true, or that sentences like
λ ∧ τ are strictly false? Providing a plausible answer does not seem to be an easy task.
But what about the minimal fixed-points of the SK- and of the SP-Jump? Do they disagree
on simple truths and simple falsities? As already hinted at when discussing Observation 5.6, it
turns out that relationship between SK-models and SP-models is very different from that between
49Recall (see Introduction) that according to Fitting, FDE “loses none of the original insights” of SK-models.
50For more details on groundedness, see [Yab82], [Lei05], [Hal14, §17].
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SK-models and FDE-models. Specifically, the minimal fixed-points of the SK- and of the SP-Jump
fully agree on what is true and what is false, that is, the extension and the anti-extension of the
two fixed-points coincide:51
Proposition 6.2. (ESKµ , ASKµ ) = (ESPµ , ASPµ ).
Proof. Consider the two transfinite sequences leading to ISKµ and ISPµ , i.e.:
ΦSK-sequence ΦSP-sequence
(E0, A0) := (∅,∅) (E′0, A′0, X ′0, ) := (∅,∅,∅)







































The groundedness property is preserved in the SP minimal fixed-point: only statements
grounded in arithmetical facts are deemed true or false. More generally, Proposition 6.2 shows
that every insight and every intuition about truth and falsity captured by ISKµ is preserved in
ISPµ . It shows that there is a very precise sense in which accepting ISPµ does not cause any loss.
The minimal fixed-point ISPµ , it may be said, is essentially a Kripkean model. But one can also
show that, while the new model does not lose any insight about truth and falsity captured by
ISKµ , it also has some advantages. In particular, unlike ISKµ , ISPµ is now able to detect (at least
some) paradoxical instances of Tr, and to know the difference between them and pathological
but unparadoxical ones.
But what are the paradoxical instances of Tr detected by ISPµ ? Do these coincide with
sentences which are paradoxical in the sense of [Kri75]? The answer to the last question turns
out to be negative. More precisely, every sentence which is paradoxical in ISPµ is also paradoxical
sensu [Kri75], but the converse does not hold. To begin with, let me show that sentences which
are paradoxical in ISPµ are undefined in every SK-fixed-point:
Lemma 6.3. Let K be the set of sentences which are paradoxical in the sense of [Kri75], that
is, put K := {ϕ | ϕ /∈
⋃
{E ∪A | (E,A) = ΦSK(E,A)}}. Then XSPµ ⊆ K.
Proof Sketch. Consider the transfinite sequence leading to ISPµ , i.e.
(E0, A0, X0, ) := (∅,∅,∅)
(Eα+1, Aα+1, Xα+1) := Φ
SP(Eα, Aα, Xα)










51As [Ros19, Proposition 4.29] noticed, this result does not hold for his canonical evaluation, which properly
extends ISKµ .
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First one observes that, if ϕ ∈ Λ, then ϕ is undefined in every SK-fixed-point. Second, by
primary induction on α and subinduction on ϕ, show that if ϕ ∈ Xα −Λ, then ϕ is undefined in
all fixed-points of ΦSK.
Interestingly, though, the Kripkean paradoxical sentences do not coincide with the SP-
paradoxical sentences:
Observation 6.4. K 6⊆ XSPµ .
Proof. I provide an example. Let τ be a Truth-teller and λ a Liar. Then (τ ∧ ¬τ) ∨ λ ∈ K but
(τ ∧ ¬τ) ∨ λ /∈ XSPµ , as VSPµ ((τ ∧ ¬τ) ∨ λ) = u.
Remark 6.5. There is an intuitive way to generalize the previous observation: for any disjunc-
tion (conjunction) ϕ ∨ ψ (ϕ ∧ ψ) such that ϕ ∈ K ∩XSPµ and ψ is an ungrounded sentence such
that the only classical value it can receive is 0 (1), it holds that ϕ ∨ ψ (ϕ ∧ ψ) is element of
K but not element of XSPµ . A more effective way of putting this is to say that, just as what is
true or false is grounded in nonsemantic facts, what is paradoxical in ISPµ depends on Λ. This
demarcates the present account of paradoxicality from that of [Kri75], where what is paradoxical
also depends on logic. In fact, note that one reason why (τ ∧ ¬τ) ∨ λ ∈ K is that τ ∧ ¬τ cannot
obtain value 1. And this is a consequence of using the logic SK.52
The last observation may be seen as an inadequacy of the present construction, as it may be
argued that every sentence in K is intuitively paradoxical, and one might suggest to substitute
‘interestingly’ with ‘unfortunately’ in the sentence introducing Observation 6.4. It has already
been mentioned that intuitions about what it means for a sentence to be paradoxical are not
as clear as intuitions about what it means for a sentence to be true or false. But it seems
rather unplausible to claim that every sentence in K is intuitively paradoxical. To mention but
a well-known example suggested by Gupta [Gup82], it can be observed that
∀x¬(Tr(x) ∧ ¬Tr(x)) ∈ K.
Intuitively, though, (or better: according to someone’s intuitions) this law of classical logic is
not paradoxical. So one might want a model within which this sentence is not paradoxical, but
undefined. And indeed, the value of ∀x¬(Tr(x) ∧ ¬Tr(x)) in the minimal fixed-point of the SP-
Jump is actually u. Be that as it may, the claim here is neither that some sentences contained in
K are not paradoxical, nor that every sentence in K is paradoxical. The only claim advocated
here is that XSPµ singles out an interesting subclass of K—namely, the subclass given by (i) base
paradoxical sentences and (ii) compositional sentences containing those as components.
Despite these important considerations about pre-theoretical intuitions on paradoxicality, it
would certainly be desirable to have a natural fixed-point construction of K. Hence we leave the
following question open for future research
52The idea of describing the set of paradoxical sentences as grounded in (or dependent on) Λ was suggested to
me by Johannes Stern, whom I thank. For any inaccuracy in the Remark, I take full responsibility.
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Open Question. Is there a way to obtain a natural fixed-point construction of the triple (E,A,X),
where (E,A) is identical to the minimal fixed-point of ΦSK and X = K?
The present conjecture is that a supervaluational version of SP can serve as a basis for a
positive answer.53
7 Concluding Remarks
The starting point of this article has been the question whether we can construct fixed-point
models which have enough resources for distinguishing between different kinds of sentences and
which can retain the insights about truth captured by SK-models, particularly the idea that
truth is consistent and grounded in nonsemantic facts. We have seen that a positive answer to
this question is possible. Specifically,
(i) like SK-models, but unlike FDE-models, SP-models do not satisfy any contradiction,
(ii) the minimal fixed point ISPµ , like ISKµ but unlike IFDEµ , is such that the only statements it
deems true or false are those grounded in arithmetical facts;
(iii) like FDE-models, but unlike SK-models, SP-models are sharp enough to differentiate be-
tween paradoxical and pathological instances of P .
Before briefly commenting on revenge paradoxes, a methodological clarification is in order:
the starting point of the above construction has not been the addition of the new truth-value
Paradoxical. The starting point has been the addition of a third set into the interpretation of P -
like predicates (see §4.1). The addition of a fourth truth-value, and the successive development
of the semantics SP, has been a consequence of this new kind of semantic interpretation of a
predicate. Of course, while I hope to have provided convincing philosophical reasons for the
introduction of the truth-value p and of the semantics SP, different semantic schemata could be
defined to assign a value to LP -sentences into an SP-structure 〈N , (E,A,X)〉.
7.1 Expressive weakness and revenge
A problem often associated with the account developed in [Kri75] is its expressive weakness and
its non-immunity to revenge paradoxes.54 The expressive weakness is due to the impossibility of
expressing, in the object language, the semantic fact that undefined sentences are not true,55 or,
to use [Sch10]’s way of putting it, something other than true. The revenge paradox then follows:
53By ‘supervaluational version of SP’, I mean the following. Let SP− be the three valued semantics obtained
from SP by dropping the value u (note that SP− is nothing but SK with p instead of u). Then a SP-supervaluation
function VSvSPI : StLTr −→ {1, 0, p, u} can be defined as follow: for v ∈ {1, 0, p}, V
SvSP
I (ϕ) = v iff, for all total
SP-interpretation I′ ≥ I (see Df. 5.2) holds VSP−I′ (ϕ) = v; otherwise V
SvSP
I (ϕ) = u.
54See for instance [Bur79].
55Note the difference between ‘not true’, without hyphen, and ‘not-true’, with hyphen. Undefined sentences,
even though they are not ‘not-true’, they are ‘not true’. Equivalently, one can say that the object language does
not have a strong negation, but only a weak one. Cf. [Sch10].
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if one extends the language with a predicate for the new semantic value u, one can construct so
called strengthened Liars or revenge sentences, namely sentences saying of themselves that they
are something other than true (i.e., not-true or undefined). Considerations of this kind have lead
for instance Schlenker to claim that “Kripke’s theory is only successful for a very small fragment
of English”. [Sch10, p. 376]
Let me emphasize that the above objection towards [Kri75] is not related to the expressive
weakness of the object language, nor to revenge issues. The present account suffers from the same
inadequacies: within our object language, we cannot express the semantic fact that a sentence
has value paradoxical or undefined, and if we augmented the language with two predicates for the
values ‘paradoxical’ and ‘undefined’, we could construct (via a suitable diagonal construction)
revenge sentences saying of themselves that they are something other than true.56
The revenge of the Liar is a difficult issue, and the literature on it is possibly as vast as
the literature on Liar paradox itself.57 The fact that the construction above is prone to revenge
might be considered a weakness. And that may well be so. However, it should also be emphasized
that, when studying Liar-like paradoxes, there are different projects one can pursue. One of this
consists in developing a sort of universal language with a type-free truth predicate, in which we
can express every relevant notion that is expressible in natural languages.58 But this is only one
goal, certainly not the only one. Kripke, for example, doubts “that such a goal can be achieved”
[Kri75, p. 714], and one might argue that the ghost of Tarski hierarchy will always be with us,
no matter how we try to get rid of it. Yet, this does not mean that there is nothing more to say
about Liar-like paradoxes. To name a recent example, [Lei19]’s goal “is not any kind of ‘universal
language’ with a type-free truth-predicate, but merely to develop a model-theoretic theory of
truth that does a bit better than Kripke’s and some others’ did” (p. 385). And that was the goal
of this article, too.
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A Proofs
This appendix contains proofs of Theorem 5.15, Theorem 5.20, and Proposition 5.16. I begin
with two auxiliary propositions.
Proposition A.1. For all ϕ ∈ LTr,Trpϕq /∈ Λ.
Proof. Let ϕ be arbitrary. To show that ϕ /∈ Λ, it suffices to define an adequate interpretation
〈N, I〉 where Trpϕq and ¬Tr(pTr(pϕq)q) have a different value. This can be defined thus:
E := {#Tripϕq | i ∈ ω}, A := ∅ =: X,
where
Tri(t) := Tr . . .Tr.︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
(t),
for Tr. representing the primitive recursive function #t 7→ #Tr(t).
Recall that, given a fixed-point ISPκ , I often adopt the abbreviation VSPκ (ϕ) := VSPISPκ (ϕ).
Proposition A.2. Every fixed-point of ΦSP is an adequate interpretation.
Proof. Given a fixed-point ISPκ of ΦSP, one has to show that #ϕ ∈ Yκ iff #Trpϕq ∈ Yκ, for
Y = E,A,X. Suppose first #ϕ ∈ Xκ. It follows that VSPκ (Trpϕq) = p, hence #Trpϕq ∈
ΦSPX (Iκ) = Xκ. Now suppose #Trpϕq ∈ Xκ, which implies that either VSPκ (Trpϕq) = p, or
that Trpϕq ∈ Λ. Since by Proposition A.1 Trpϕq /∈ Λ, it follows that VSPκ (Trpϕq) = p. Hence,
since VSPκ (Trpϕq) = p, we get #ϕ ∈ Iκ. With a similar argument, one shows that #ϕ ∈ Yκ iff
#Trpϕq ∈ Yκ, for Y = E,A.
Theorem 5.15.
(a) ΦSP has a least fixed-point Iµ which is such that VSPIµ (λ) = p for all λ ∈ Λ and V
SP
Iµ (τ) = u
for all τ ∈ Θ.
(b) Any fixed-point Iκ of ΦSP is such that VSPIκ (λ) = p for all λ ∈ Λ.
(c) Any fixed-point Iκ of ΦSP is such that VSPIκ (ϕ) = V
SP
Iκ (Trpϕq), for all ϕ ∈ LTr.
Proof. I begin by showing that ΦSP has a minimal fixed-point. Consider the sequences
ΦSK-sequence ΦSP-sequence
(E0, A0) := (∅,∅) (E′0, A′0, X ′0, ) := (∅,∅,∅)
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As remarked in the proof of Proposition 6.2, due to Observation 5.6, (ESKα , ASKα ) = (E′SPα , A′SPα ),
for all α, hence in particular (ESKµ , ASKµ ) = (E′SPµ , A′SPµ ). What I have to show is that, at each α, I ′α
is an SP-interpretation, i.e., X ′α∩(E′α∪A′α) = ∅. Suppose by i.h. that I ′β is an SP-interpretation.
Consider an arbitrary ϕ ∈ X ′β+1−Λ. It follows that VSPIβ (ϕ) = p, hence V
SP
Iβ (ϕ) /∈ {1, 0}, which is
equivalent to #ϕ /∈ E′β+1∪A′β+1. So let ϕ ∈ X ′β+1∩Λ. Since ϕ ∈ Λ, by Lemma 6.3 we derive that
ϕ /∈ Eµ∪Aµ. It follows that ϕ /∈ Eβ+1∪Aβ+1 hence ϕ /∈ E′β+1∪A′β+1. Since we have shown that
the ΦSP-sequence is an increasing sequence of SP-interpretations, by cardinality considerations
it will reach a fixed-point, that can be shown to be contained in any other fixed-point of ΦSP.59
I now show that VSPκ (λ) = p for all λ ∈ Λ and for all fixed-points Iκ. So let ϕ ∈ Λ, which
means that ϕ and ¬Trpϕq have the same value in every adequate interpretation. Since ϕ ∈ Λ,
we have #ϕ ∈ ΦSPX (Iκ) = Xκ, which is equivalent to VSPκ (Trpϕq) = p = VSPκ (¬Trpϕq). Since Iκ
is adequate by Proposition A.2, we get VSPκ (¬Trpϕq) = VSPκ (ϕ) = p.
I next show that VSPµ (τ) = u for all τ ∈ Θ. Let τ ∈ Θ be arbitrary, and define
ISK := 〈{#Tripτq | i ∈ ω},∅〉 ISP := 〈{#Tripτq | i ∈ ω},∅,∅〉
ISP is adequate in the sense of Df. 5.9. Then consider the sequences
ISK0 := ISK ISP0 := ISP








By soundness of ISK0 and ISP0 , we obtain fixed-points, say ISKξ and ISPξ , identical modulo XSPξ .
Since VSKISKξ (τ) = 1 = V
SP
ISPξ
(τ) = 1, we obtain that τ /∈ XSPµ by contraposition on Lemma 6.3.
The argument for (c) is standard, except that it uses that VSPIκ (λ) = p for all λ ∈ Λ.
Theorem 5.20.
(a) ΓSP has a least fixed-point Iµ which is contained in every other. Moreover, (i) for all
〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 ∈ R, VSPIµ (t ε̇ {x | ϕ}) = p, and (ii) for all 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 ∈ S V
SP
Iµ (t ε̇ {x | ϕ}) = u.
(b) Any fixed-point I ε̇κ of ΓSP is such that VSPIκ (t ε̇ {x | ϕ}) = V
SP
Iκ (ϕ[t/x]), for all ϕ ∈ Lε̇.
(c) Any fixed-point I ε̇κ of ΓSP is such that VSPIκ (t ε̇ {x | ϕ}) = p for all 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 ∈ R.
Proof. For (a), we show that every sound interpretation can be extended to a fixed-point con-
taining it. Intuitively, the claim is that if we start the iteration of ΓSP on a sound interpretation
I ε̇, we end up with an SP-interpretation. To show this formally, consider the sequence:




59Recall that a sequence (xα)α∈On is strongly increasing if for all α, xα < xα+1. The above sequence is only
weakly increasing as for some β we have ISPβ = I
SP
β+1 and the sequence remains constant from that point on.
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By transfinite induction on α, we show that any Iα is an SP-interpretation. The crucial obser-
vations is that, for all α,
R ∩ (Eα ∪Aα) = ∅, (1)
To show (1), one can reason by transfinite induction. For α = 0, suppose by reductio 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 ∈
R ∩ (E0 ∪ A0), for some 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉. Assume 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 ∈ E0. Then VSP0 (t ε̇ {x | ϕ}) = 1. By
Df. 5.17 of R, we obtain VSP0 (¬ϕ[t/x]) = 1, which is the case iff VSP0 (ϕ[t/x]) = 0. But then
〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 ∈ A1 and not in E1, contradicting the soundness of I0. Symmetrically, it can be
shown that 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 /∈ A0. For α = β + 1, assume by i.h. that R ∩ (Eβ ∪ Aβ) = ∅. Then, if
〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 ∈ R, then Vβ(t ε̇ {x | ϕ}) /∈ {1, 0}, hence 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 /∈ (Eβ+1 ∪ Aβ+1). Since limits
are just unions, (1) has been established.
The fact that for all α, Iα is an SP interpretation then follows rather immediately. In fact,
suppose that Iβ is a disjoint triple, which implies that every sentence has a unique value. This
immediately yields that Eβ+1 ∩ Aβ+1 = ∅. Now suppose that 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 ∈ Xβ+1. Then either
〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 ∈ R, which by (1) implies 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 /∈ Eβ+1 ∪Aβ+1, or VSPIβ (ϕ[t/x]) = p, and hence
VSPIβ (ϕ[t/x]) /∈ {1, 0}, and hence 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 /∈ Eβ+1 ∪Aβ+1.
By cardinality considerations, the weakly increasing sequence reaches a fixed-point.
The arguments for the remaining claims are similar to those of Theorem 5.15. I just show (c)
and a-(ii), beginning with (c). Suppose 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 ∈ R. Then, for Iκ an arbitrary fixed-point
of ΓSP, we have 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 ∈ ΓSPX (Iκ) = Xκ, which is equivalent to VSPκ (t ε̇ {x | ϕ}) = p iff
VSPκ (¬ϕ[t/x]) = p = VSPκ (ϕ[t/x]).
As for (a)-(ii), we have to show that VSPIµ (t ε̇ {x | ϕ}) = u for all 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 ∈ S. First notice
that S ∩ R = ∅. Then consider the sequence leading to the minimal fixed-point of ΓSP, i.e., the
one starting the iteration of ΓSP on I0 := 〈∅,∅,∅〉. Clearly, for any 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 ∈ S,VSP0 (t ε̇ {x |
ϕ}) = u = VSPI0 (ϕ[t/v]). Supposing by i.h. that V
SP
Iβ (t ε̇ {x | ϕ}) = u = V
SP
Iβ (ϕ[t/v]), we
immediately get 〈t, {x | ϕ}〉 /∈ I ε̇β+1.
Let ΦSP
?




Proposition 5.16. (i) A Curry sentence κ is paradoxical in both ISPµ and ISPµ? ; (ii) the McGee
sentence µ is paradoxical in ISPµ and undefined in ISPµ? ; (iii) liar cycles are paradoxical in ISPµ
and undefined in ISPµ? .
Proof. (i) A Curry sentence (with a false consequent) is a sentence κ equivalent over N with
Trpκq→ 0 = 1, which in our framework is equivalent to ¬Trpκq∨ 0 = 1.60 Since ¬Trpκq∨ 0 = 1






60Note that, since LPA does not have a conditional, the analysis of Curry sentences amounts to an analysis of
Liars with Boolean compounds. See [BGR20] for details.
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(ii) For the McGee sentence,61 let me begin by showing that µ is undefined in the minimal
fixed-point constructed using Λ?. To begin with, µ is equivalent over N to
∃x¬Trf. (x, pµq)),
where f. (x, y) is a function symbol representing the primitive recursive operation
n,#ϕ 7→ #Trnpϕq.
First one shows that µ 6≡Neq ¬Trpµq by considering an interpretation like
I = (E,A,X) := ({µ}, {Trpµq}, ∅),
and second one notices that by Proposition A.1, for n > 0,#Trnpµq /∈ Λ?. So for any n,Trnpµq /∈
Λ?. Now if µ has value p in ISPµ? , then, by Df. 5.3(e), for some nk ∈ ω, VSPµ? (¬Trf. (nk, pµq)) = p,
which is the case iff #Trnkpµq ∈ Xµ? . Since we have just seen that Trnkpµq /∈ Λ?, it follows that
VSPα (Tr
nkpµq) = p for some level α in the construction of the minimal fixed-point. By transfinite
induction on α, and subinduction on n, show that for α and for all n,VSPα (Tr
npµq) 6= p.
To show, to the contrary, that µ is paradoxical in ISPµ , one shows that µ ∈ Λ as follows:
suppose, for some adequate SP-interpretation I, that VSPI (µ) = 1. Then VSPI (∃x¬Trf. (x, pµq))) =
1 iff, by Df. 5.3(e), for some n ∈ ω,VSPI (¬Trf. (n, pµq))) = 1 iff #Tr
npµq ∈ A. By adequacy, we
have #Tripµq ∈ A for all i ∈ ω hence in particular i = 0, hence µ ∈ A which is the case precisely
if VSPI (¬Trpµq) = 1. The same argument, mutatis mutandis, works for the other values 0, p, u.
Since #µ ∈ Λ ⊆ Xµ, we have by adequacy of the minimal fixed-point that #Tripµq ∈ Xµ for all
i ∈ ω. Hence VSPµ (¬Tr(n, pµq)) = p for all n ∈ ω, hence VSPµ (∃x¬Trf. (x, pµq)) = p = V
SP
µ (µ).
(iii) We show the argument for a 2-Liar cycle, for n Liar cycles the argument being similar,




To see that λi 6≡Neq ¬Trpλiq, for i = 1, 2 just consider the following interpretations
〈{λ1}, {λ2}, ∅〉 〈∅, {λ2, λ1}, ∅〉
Hence {λ1, λ2}∩Λ? = ∅. It is then easy to verify that {λ1, λ2}∩Iα = ∅ for all α leading to the
minimal fixed-point of ΦSP
?
.
In order to show that λ1 and λ2 are paradoxical in ISPµ , one first shows that λ1 ∈ Λ. It then
follows that they both have value p in ISPµ .
61It may be worth mentioning that in [Ros19], the McGee sentence has the same status as Liars and Curry
sentences.
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Remark A.3. Observe that λ2 is not element of Λ. Its value is contingent on the value of λ1.
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